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Abstract: Authoritarianism has been predominantly utilized in American politics as a predictor of 
Republican identification and conservative policy preferences. We argue that this approach has 
neglected the role authoritarianism plays among Democrats and how it can operate within 
political parties regardless of their ideological orientation. Drawing from three distinct sets of 
data, we demonstrate the impact of authoritarianism in the 2016 Democratic Party’s primaries. 
Authoritarianism consistently predicts differences in primary voting among Democrats, 
particularly support for Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders. This effect is robust across various 
model specifications including controls for ideology, partisan strength, and other predispositions. 
These results highlight the potential of authoritarianism to shape leadership preferences within 
the Democratic Party. We advocate for a reconsideration of authoritarianism as a disposition 
with meaningful consequences for intraparty dynamics and conclude with practical implications 
regarding the future of the Democratic Party. 
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Although the 2016 election brought authoritarianism into mainstream American political 
discourse (MacWilliams 2016), the dominant narrative focused almost exclusively on 
Republicans who consistently fall on the high end of the authoritarianism scale (Federico and 
Tagar 2014; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). While it is true that high authoritarians have sorted 
en masse into the Republican Party, it is a misconception that authoritarianism has little to no 
significance within the Democratic Party. Though Republicans tend to exhibit higher levels of 
authoritarianism than Democrats, there is substantial variation in authoritarianism among 
Democrats. We argue that disregarding these intraparty divisions provides an incomplete 
account of authoritarianism’s role in the current political landscape. 
This research note addresses these concerns by demonstrating that authoritarianism not 
only exists within the Democratic Party, but exerted strong and divisive effects on voting 
preferences within the 2016 primary between relatively moderate, establishment candidate 
Hillary Clinton and progressive, populist candidate Bernie Sanders. Specifically, high 
authoritarian Democrats supported Clinton while low authoritarian Democrats supported 
Sanders. We speculate that this authoritarian divide will further complicate the Democratic 
leadership’s attempts to unify their party’s base in future elections. 
Authoritarianism and the Democratic Party 
 
Authoritarianism reflects a spectrum of psychological group orientations ranging from 
individual autonomy to social conformity (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 
2005), where high authoritarians possess dispositional needs for order, certainty, and security, 
and adherence to conventional, established institutions (Jost et al. 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 
2009). Accordingly, authoritarian dispositions provide a functional link to ideological 
conservatism (Federico and Tagar 2014), right-wing policy preferences (Johnston and Wronski 
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2015; Hetherington and Suhay 2011), and traditionalism (Federico, Fisher, and Deason 2011). 
 
Yet the construct of authoritarianism also contains group-centric components, which 
motivate authoritarians to structure their group in ways that, “…enhance sameness and minimize 
diversity of people, beliefs, and behaviors” (Stenner 2005: 16). From this perspective, 
authoritarians aim to protect the group's cohesion from members and leaders who do not comply 
with the group’s values and norms. Importantly, this component of authoritarianism is grounded 
in the desire to be part of a group, not in identification with a particular social or political group 
(Duckitt 1989; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005). Taking these conceptualizations together, 
authoritarians should be more committed to their political party (per Luttig 2017), and support 
leaders that are more conventional or prototypical of the group (Hogg 2001). 
The 2016 Democratic primary election provides an excellent context of intra-party 
competition within which to examine the effects of authoritarianism on vote choice. On one 
hand, Clinton was a traditional candidate, being relatively hawkish and religious, and a group 
exemplar with a decades-long career in the party. On the other hand, Sanders was a non- 
traditional, party outsider who adopted the Democratic label more recently and distinguished 
himself as a “democratic socialist.” Authoritarianism could, therefore, shape Democratic primary 
vote choice on the basis of its association with traditionalism (Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011; 
Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and its latent motive to preserve group uniformity and support 
more prototypical group leaders (Stenner 2005; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005; Hogg 2001). We 
thus predict an authoritarian divide among Democrats in the 2016 primary elections, with high 
authoritarians gravitating towards Clinton and low authoritarians towards Sanders. 
Data and Methods 
 
To test the effects of authoritarianism among Democrats, we utilized data from two 
 
 
 
 
2"
nationally diverse sources: the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) 
University of Mississippi module (Dowling 2016), and a YouGov study fielded Fall 2017 
(N=1000 each, see Table A1). We also used a nonprobability sample of undergraduates from five 
Southern universities, comprised predominantly of first-time voters (N=955, see Table A1). The 
student sample provides a test of our hypothesis among individuals whose political ideology and 
partisan loyalties are still malleable (Campbell et al. 1960), while their dispositional traits, like 
authoritarianism, are relatively stable and exogenous to political socialization (McCourt et al. 
1999). Thus, although the student sample is non-representative, it allows us to examine to what 
extent authoritarianism among young Democrats is already a predictive force of their voting 
behavior and how its effect compares to their developing political preferences such as 
partisanship and ideology. Since we are primarily interested in divisions within the Democratic 
Party, our full models only include Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the 
2016 primary1 (N=295 CCES, N=217 YouGov, and N=163 student sample). 
All datasets contained the child-rearing measure of authoritarianism (Feldman 2003), 
coded 0-1, with higher values reflecting greater authoritarianism. This scale relates directly to the 
aggression and submission components of authoritarianism (see Feldman and Stenner 1997; 
Stenner 2005), and is highly correlated with conventionalism and Altemeyer's (1988) Right- 
Wing Authoritarianism scale (see Feldman 2003). Of particular relevance, this child-rearing 
scale is the standard measure of authoritarianism used in contemporary American politics 
research (see Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and in examining vote choice in the 2016 election 
(MacWilliams 2016). Though some scholars argue that this scale assesses authoritarianism 
 
1"Democratic primary voters not voting for Clinton or Sanders either voted for a Republican 
(student sample: N=10, CCES: N=18), or did not recall who they voted for (YouGov: N=6). 
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differentially across race (Pérez and Hetherington 2014), our analyses combine Whites and non- 
Whites in order to properly reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of Democratic voters (though 
our key results generally hold when examining Whites and non-Whites separately despite 
reduced sample size, see Figure A4, Table A7a & A7b). 
The distribution of authoritarianism in our primary national dataset, the CCES (see 
Figure 1a), confirms that Republicans (N=341, mean=0.62) are significantly more authoritarian 
than Democrats (N=461, mean=0.48, t=-6.4, p<0.001 in an independent t-test with unequal 
variances). Concurrently, however, the variation in authoritarianism is significantly higher 
among Democrats than Republicans (standard deviations of 0.35 and 0.30 respectively, F=1.39, 
p<0.0012, in a standard variance comparison test). Notably, the difference between Clinton and 
Sanders supporters (N=187, mean=0.52, and N=108, mean=0.29, respectively, t = 5.66, p<0.001) 
is larger than the difference between Republicans and Democrats (0.23 versus 0.14 respectively, 
see Figure 1b). We replicate this pattern of variation in our other national sample (YouGov), 
while the student sample reveals equal variances in authoritarianism across parties (Figures A1a- 
A2b). There is no similar divide among Republicans between Trump and Cruz primary voters in 
any of our samples (Figure A3a-A3c). Thus, the intraparty distribution of authoritarianism is 
largely unique to the Democratic Party. 
Figures 1a and 1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (CCES) 
 
 
Note: Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. 
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Our dependent variable is the dichotomous primary vote choice between Sanders (0) and 
Clinton (1). We control for self-reported ideology and partisan strength in order to examine the 
effects of authoritarianism independent of these relevant factors. In the YouGov study, we 
account for the possibility that alternative individual difference variables, including social 
dominance orientation (SDO), need for cognitive closure, and racial resentment, could shape 
vote choice. Last, in all three samples, we include controls for education, church attendance, 
gender, and race, while the CCES and the YouGov sample add controls for income, union 
membership, Southern residence, and marital status2. 
Predicting 2016 Democratic Primary Vote Choice 
 
We first logistically regress vote choice for Clinton versus Sanders on authoritarianism 
and our aforementioned control variables3 (Figure 2 & Table A3, see also Tables A4-A6 for 
robustness checks). In line with our expectations, authoritarianism is a significant and positive 
predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in all samples. In the CCES and YouGov samples, 
partisan strength is also a positive predictor of voting for Clinton. However, it was not a 
significant determinant in the undergraduate sample, demonstrating the primacy of authoritarian 
dispositions in shaping young people’s political preferences. Similarly, ideology is only a 
significant predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in the YouGov sample, indicating that 
authoritarianism operates above and beyond ideological identification and partisan strength. 
Finally, we find that authoritarianism is the only significant predispositional measure, suggesting 
 
 
2"These variables are dropped in the student models given their lack of variation. See Table A2 
for all variable descriptions. 
3"Addition of the controls reduces the CCES sample to N=260, the YouGov sample to N=195, 
and the student sample to N=101 in the presented models. 
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that this candidate match-up specifically resonates with Democrats' authoritarian dispositions. 
 
Figure 2: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders 
 
Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, 
and the 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, 
which is measured in decades (see Table A2 for variable details). 
 
The predicted probabilities displayed in Figure 3 clearly illustrate the effects of 
authoritarianism on Democratic vote choice in all three data sets. As a Democrat in the CCES 
sample moves from the minimum value on the authoritarianism scale to the maximum value, the 
probability of voting for Clinton increases from 0.33 to 0.76 while holding other influential 
factors constant. Similarly, the probability of voting for Clinton rises from 0.36 to 0.71 across the 
range of authoritarianism in the YouGov sample, closely mirroring the results from the CCES. 
Among students, the effect is even larger – the probability of voting for Clinton increases 
dramatically from 0.18 to 0.867 as young Democrats shift from the lower end of authoritarianism 
to its maximum value. 
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities based on Logistic Regression Results 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated holding all variables at their mean or modal categories (see Table A1). 
 
These results provide evidence for an authoritarian divide among Democrats that played a 
crucial role in the 2016 primary. Importantly, these effects are driven by respondents at both the 
low and high ends of authoritarianism. Surprisingly, we do not find any significant effect of 
authoritarianism among Republicans’ primary vote choice in all three samples (see Figure A5 & 
Table A8), which underlines the uniquely divisive nature of authoritarianism among Democrats. 
Moreover, as we have shown by replicating our results with a student sample, this authoritarian 
divide is already discernable among young Democrats whose party loyalties and ideological 
preferences are not yet solidified. This emphasizes the importance of authoritarianism, even 
among first-time voters. 
Conclusion 
 
We have demonstrated that authoritarianism 1) exists within the Democratic Party, where 
variation on this disposition abounds, 2) imparts differential effects on vote choice, highlighting 
intraparty conflicts, and 3) predicts political preferences, even among youth, for whom partisan 
strength and ideology are less stable factors. In 2016, Clinton was the more traditional candidate, 
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with a long history as a brand name party figure who had taken on various leadership roles – 
characteristics which should appeal to authoritarian Democrats. In contrast, Sanders was an 
Independent turned Democrat, who promoted an aggressively liberal agenda with an 
unambiguous disdain for the party establishment, all of which authoritarians should eschew. 
While we discuss traditionalism and group-centric aspects of authoritarianism, the causal 
mechanism by which this trait affected Democrats’ vote choice remains unclear in the present 
data. Future research should assess how these aspects of authoritarianism shape electoral 
behavior among voters in both parties. 
Where do Democrats go from here? Our results suggest that the party should be 
cognizant of the potentially conflicting leadership preferences of their base. Indeed, within 
months of Trump’s victory, the election for Democratic National Committee Chair again divided 
the party into Sanders and Clinton factions. The newly formed Justice Democrats Political 
Action Committee has called for the ousting of establishment incumbents, and has endorsed 
dozens of Sanders-style candidates for the 2018 primaries. All of these events are indicative of 
intraparty battles that could continue dividing Democrats along the authoritarian dimension. 
Such disputes over the party’s brand have the potential to weaken party attachments and political 
engagement among Democrats (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 2015). Notably, such divisions were 
not found in Republican primary voting patterns, highlighting an important partisan asymmetry 
(per Federico, Deason and Fisher 2012). We hope that our findings motivate further research on 
authoritarianism among Democrats and how this disposition affects the party’s future leadership. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Sample Characteristics for Democrat Primary Voting Respondents 
 
 CCES Sample YouGov Sample Student Sample 
Authoritarianism 0.44 0.41 0.28 
PID Strength 0.74 0.74 0.67 
Ideology 0.30 0.29 0.20 
Church Attendance 0.36 0.27 0.42 
Gender 54% Female 60% Female 54% Female 
Race 67% White 64% White 65% White 
Education 0.63 0.54 -- 
Income 0.34 0.27 -- 
Union Membership 33% Union 30% Union -- 
Martial Status 48% Married 46% Married -- 
Age 5.1 5.3 -- 
Southern Residence 30% live in the South 26% live in the South -- 
Need for Closure -- 0.61 -- 
Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) 
-- 0.18 -- 
Symbolic Racism/ 
Racial Resentment 
0.15 0.31 -- 
Democratic Primary 
Vote Choice 
Clinton 63%, 
Sanders 37% 
Clinton 56%, 
Sanders 44% 
Clinton 28%, 
Sanders 72% 
N 295 217 163 
Sample characteristics are calculated for Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the 2016 
primary. We provide sample characteristics for this subset of respondents, rather than the full sample, 
because these are the respondents used in the key analyses presented in Figures 1b, 2, and 3. For partisan 
strength, ideology, church attendance, education, need for closure, SDO, and symbolic racism/racial 
resentment we report mean values on a 0-1 scale. For age (in decades) and income, we report median values. 
For gender, race, union membership, and martial status, we report the percentage of observations in the 
specified category. See Table A2 for all item descriptions and coding. 
 
Sample methodology: The 2016 CCES University of Mississippi module (N=1000) was administered by 
YouGov/Polimetrix, and included the child-rearing authoritarianism scale in the pre-election wave of the 
survey. The 2016 CCES pre-election wave common content supplied the dependent and control variables. 
The YouGov survey (N=1000) was administered September 29-October 10, 2017, though 2016 primary vote 
choice and other demographic variables were gathered as part of the YouGov/Polimetrix panel in 2016. 
Thus, the Democratic primary vote choice variable in the CCES and YouGov samples reflect a similar recall 
task. YouGov/Polimetrix matches respondents to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party 
identification, ideology, and political interest. This frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the 
full 2010 American Community Survey with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements. 
955 students across five public universities in the South participated in our survey the week prior to the 2016 
general election either voluntarily or for course credit. 
Table A2: Item Descriptions and Coding 
 
Item Name Item Description 
Authoritarianism "Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children 
should have, every person thinks that some are more important than 
others. Please select which one you think is more important for a child to 
have:" 
1.!Independence or Respect for Elders 
2.!Curiosity or Good Manners 
3.!Self-Reliance or Obedience 
4.!Being Considerate or Well-Behaved 
All four items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values 
represent greater levels of authoritarianism. 
PID Strength 1=Strong Democrat/Republican, .5=Not so Strong Democrat/Republican, 
0=Weak Democrat/Republican 
Ideology 5-point (CESS & YouGov) or 7-point (student sample) ideological self- 
placement scale, recoded 0-1 from 0=Very Liberal to 1=Very 
Conservative 
Church Attendance 6-point scale, recoded 0-1 to range from 0=Never Attend to 1=Attend 
more than once a week 
Gender 1=Female, 0=Male 
Race 1=White, 0=non-White 
Education 6-point self-placement scale of highest level of education, recoded 0-1 
from 0=No High School to 1=Post-Graduate Degree 
Income 16-category family income self-report item, recoded 0-1 from 0=Less 
than $10,000 to 1=$500,000 or More 
Union Membership 1=Previously or currently belong to a union, 0=Never belonged to a union 
Martial Status 1=Married, 0=Otherwise 
Age Years old in decades 
Southern Residence 1=Lives in the South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia), 0=Otherwise 
Need for Closure "For the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or 
disagreement with each statement." 
1.!I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
2.!I dislike unpredictable or uncertain situations. 
3.!I dislike questions that could be answered in many different ways. 
Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree, 
Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All three 
items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent 
greater need for cognitive closure. 
Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) 
"Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with them. Choose the response from the 
rating scale that best represents your evaluation of the item." 
1.!Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2.!If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
3.!Group equality should be our ideal. 
4.!We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree, 
 Moderately Agree, Slightly Agree, Slightly Disagree, Moderately 
Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four items are scaled together, and 
coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater SDO. 
Racial Resentment 
(YouGov sample) 
"Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of 
the following statements." 
1.!Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice 
and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special 
favors. 
2.!It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks 
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
3.!Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that 
make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 
4.!Most blacks who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they 
only have themselves to blame. 
Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree, 
Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four 
items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent 
greater racial resentment. 
Symbolic Racism 
(CCES sample) 
"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" 
1.!I am angry that racism exists. 
2.!White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color 
of their skin. 
3.!Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. 
Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Agree Slightly, Disagree Slightly, Disagree, and Strongly 
Disagree. All three items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that 
higher values represent greater symbolic racism. 
Democratic Primary 
Vote Choice 
In the CCES sample, respondents were first asked if they voted in any 
2016 primary, while in the YouGov sample they were first asked if they 
voted in the 2016 Democratic primary. In both studies, those that 
answered "yes" to this item received a follow-up question asking who 
they voted for. Options in the CCES included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie 
Sanders, Another Democrat, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, 
Marco Rubio, Another Republican, and Someone else who is not a 
Democrat or Republican. Options in the YouGov study included: Hillary 
Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Someone Else, and Don't Recall. 
 
In the student sample, respondents were asked: "Who did you vote for in 
your state's presidential primary?" Response options included: Hillary 
Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Other, 
and Didn't Vote in Primary. 
 
For each sample, the variable of Democratic primary vote choice is 
constructed such that those who said they voted for Bernie Sanders were 
coded 0, and those voting for Hillary Clinton were coded 1. The few 
primary voting respondents who did not choose either of these 
Democratic primary candidates either voted for a Republican, or could 
not recall who they voted for. We treat these other responses as noise, and 
are coded as blank. 
 
 
Figures A1a & A1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (YouGov) 
 
Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov study. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open 
circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a 
significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats (N=358, mean=0.47) and Republicans 
(N=233, mean = 0.61, t= 4.82, p < 0.001). In a variance comparison test, we also find that Democrats 
(st.dev. = 0.37) exhibit significantly higher variation in authoritarianism than Republicans (st.dev = 0.31,  F 
= 0.69, p < 0.01). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in 
authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton (N = 112, mean = 0.54) and Democrats 
who supported Bernie Sanders (N = 72, mean = 0.29, t = 4.96, p < 0.001). 
 
Figures A2a & A2b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (Students) 
  
Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open 
circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a 
significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats (N=349, mean=0.30) and Republicans 
(N=405, mean = 0.52, t= 10.23, p < 0.001). In a variance comparison test, we find no significant  difference 
in the variation in authoritarianism between Democrats (st.dev. = 0.28) and Republicans (st.dev. 
= 0.30, F = 1.14, p < 0.18). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference 
in authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton (N = 43, mean = 0.40) and 
Democrats who supported Bernie Sanders (N = 113, mean = 0.22, t = -3.20, p < 0.01). 
Figure A3a: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote 
Choice (CCES) 
 
Note: Data come from the 2016 CCES. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles 
indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no significant 
difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump (N=125, mean = 0.66) 
and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=44, mean = 0.61) in the 2016 primary  elections (t = 0.94, p 
< 0.35). 
 
Figure A3b: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote 
Choice (YouGov) 
 
Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles 
indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no significant 
difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump (N= 69, mean = 0.64) 
and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=34, mean = 0.58, t= -0.93, p< 0.36). 
Figure A3c: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote 
Choice (Students) 
 
Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open 
circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no 
significant difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump (N= 73, mean 
= 0.54) and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=44, mean = 0.59, t= -0.86, p< 0.39). 
 Table A3: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (corresponding 
with Figure 2) 
 
 CCES YouGov Students 
Authoritarianism 1.88 (0.50) 1.47 (0.57) 3.36 (1.12) 
PID Strength 1.01 (0.42) 1.56 (0.49) 0.49 (0.67) 
Ideology 1.14 (0.76) 2.74 (0.92) -1.03 (1.92) 
Church Attendance 0.22 (0.50) 0.48 (0.83) 0.65 (0.86) 
Gender -0.30 (0.32) -0.54 (0.39) -0.01 (0.49) 
Race -0.51 (0.37) -0.70 (0.47) 0.93 (0.56) 
Education -0.52 (0.58) 0.01 (0.67) - 
Income 3.16 (0.94) 1.11 (1.03) - 
Union Membership -0.23 (0.31) -1.04 (0.39) - 
Marital Status -0.24 (0.35) 0.28 (0.42) - 
Age 0.21 (0.09) 0.14 (0.13) - 
South 0.43 (0.33) 0.34 (0.44) - 
Need for Closure - -0.54 (1.07) - 
SDO - -1.57 (1.27) - 
Racial Resentment - 0.39 (0.86) - 
Constant -2.60 (0.80) -1.97 (1.10) -2.80 (0.97) 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.23 0.15 
N 260 195 101 
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 
to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05. 
Table A4: Heckman Probit Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders 
 
 CCES YouGov Students 
Authoritarianism 0.76 (0.22) 0.55 (0.24) 1.91 (1.09)+ 
PID Strength -0.06 (0.19) 0.30 (0.20) 0.47 (2.03) 
Ideology 0.63 (0.30) 1.04 (0.33) -0.39 (0.94) 
Church Attendance 0.12 (0.22) 0.38 (0.28) 0.35 (0.52) 
Gender -0.09 (0.15) -0.13 (0.16) -0.05 (0.48) 
Race -0.40 (0.16) -0.26 (0.19) 0.56 (0.41) 
Education -0.31 (0.25) 0.01 (0.26) - 
Income 1.56 (0.41) 0.48 (0.39) - 
Union Membership -0.11 (0.13) -0.48 (0.16) - 
Marital Status -0.12 (0.14) 0.04 (0.16) - 
Age 0.07 (0.04)+ -0.04 (0.05) - 
South 0.16 (0.15) 0.14 (0.14) - 
Need for Closure - -0.35 (0.40) - 
SDO - -0.71 (0.47) - 
Racial Resentment - 0.13 (0.26) - 
Constant -0.07 (0.34) 0.72 (0.41)+ -2.03 (3.56) 
    
Selection    
PID Strength 0.90 (0.16) 0.48 (0.16) 1.02 (0.19) 
Age 0.07 (0.04)+ 0.14 (0.04) - 
Gender -0.24 (0.13)+ -0.05 (0.13) -0.20 (0.16) 
Race 0.33 (0.13) -0.03 (0.13) 0.01 (0.15) 
Constant -0.72 (0.22) -1.01 (0.22) -0.96 (0.19) 
N 427 423 340 
Censored N 167 228 239 
Uncensored N 260 195 101 
Note: Estimates were obtained using a Heckman probit model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and  1 
indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. PID strength, age, gender, and race were used as selection variables 
for the models relying on the CCES and YouGov data, whereas the student sample model relies on PID 
strength, gender, and race. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except 
for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and + when p<.10. 
Table A5: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders Excluding 
Partisan Strength and Ideology 
 
 CCES YouGov Students 
Authoritarianism 2.05 (0.49) 2.13 (0.50) 3.07 (0.92) 
Church Attendance 0.54 (0.48) 0.95 (0.64) 0.56 (0.84) 
Gender -0.14 (0.31) -0.29 (0.32) -0.12 (0.48) 
Race -0.58 (0.36) -0.54 (0.37) 1.01 (0.56)+ 
Education -0.76 (0.58) -0.06 (0.60) - 
Income 3.02 (0.91) -0.01 (0.89) - 
Union Membership -0.18 (0.30) -0.66 (0.34)+ - 
Marital Status -0.09 (0.34) 0.31 (0.35) - 
Age 0.21 (0.08) 0.20 (0.11)+ - 
South 0.44 (0.33) -0.12 (0.35) - 
Need for Closure - 0.20 (0.85) - 
SDO - -1.21 (1.03) - 
Racial Resentment - -0.34 (0.77) - 
Constant -1.63 (0.70) -1.12 (0.92) -2.53 (0.76) 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.15 0.13 
N 262 220 101 
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 
to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and + 
when p<.10. 
 
In the CCES and YouGov samples, the coefficients for authoritarianism are larger when not controlling for 
respondents' partisan strength and ideology, suggesting that a portion of authoritarianism's effect on 
Democratic primary vote choice may be mediated through individuals' partisan strength and ideological 
self-identification. However, as seen in Figure 2 and Table A3, authoritarianism is still a significant 
predictor of vote choice even when holding partisan strength and ideology constant, meaning that 
authoritarianism operates above and beyond its association with increased party attachment (see Luttig 
2017) and ideological conservatism (see Federico et al. 2011). Interestingly, the coefficient for 
authoritarianism in the student sample is smaller when not controlling for partisan strength and ideology, 
indicating that any mediation of authoritarianism through partisanship and ideology has not occurred yet 
among these younger voters. 
Table A6: Two Additional Robustness Models – Logistic Regression Results Voting for 
Clinton over Sanders Including Symbolic Racism (CCES) & Excluding Church 
Attendance (Students) 
 
 CCES Students 
Authoritarianism 2.00 (0.60) 2.30 (0.77) 
PID Strength 0.84 (0.45)+ 0.91 (0.56) 
Ideology 1.89 (0.90) 0.77 (1.37) 
Church Attendance -0.54 (0.57) - 
Gender -0.25 (0.35) 0.26 (0.39) 
Race -0.77 (0.42)+ 0.52 (0.44) 
Education -0.56 (0.67) - 
Income 3.46 (1.18) - 
Union Membership -0.41 (0.34) - 
Marital Status -0.25 (0.41) - 
Age 0.27 (0.10) - 
South 0.36 (0.36) - 
Symbolic Racism -0.33 (1.16) - 
Constant -2.50 (0.93) -2.94 (0.71) 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.08 
N 208 154 
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 
and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for 
age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and + when p<.10. 
 
We find that when holding racial attitudes constant in the CCES sample, authoritarianism is still a significant 
predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders. Further, symbolic racism has no bearing on Democratic 
primary vote choice. 
 
Since not all of the universities participating in the student sample asked about church attendance (dropping 
N=53 respondents from the model shown in Figure 2), we wanted to ensure that the effect of authoritarianism 
on Democratic vote choice held even when including those respondents – which it does. 
Figure A4: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Whites v. Non- 
Whites) 
 
Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models distinguishing between White and non-White 
respondents. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate 
comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 
1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 
2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 
to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05, and + 
when p<.10. In the non-Whites models, the non-significant authoritarianism coefficient may be the result of 
insufficient N, or the nature of the child-rearing authoritarianism measure "behaving" differently for non-
Whites (see Perez & Hetherington 2014). In all models the authoritarianism coefficient is still in the direction 
of predicting vote choice for Clinton over Sanders. 
Table A7a: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Whites) 
 CCES YouGov Students 
Authoritarianism 2.14 (0.64) 1.90 (0.88) 2.71 (1.19) 
PID Strength 0.69 (0.49) 2.38 (0.63) 0.52 (0.97) 
Ideology 1.72 (0.99)+ 2.47 (1.26) 6.30 (3.41)+ 
Church Attendance 0.07 (0.62) 1.11 (1.11) -0.15 (1.07) 
Gender -0.28 (0.38) -0.33 (0.56) 0.32 (0.68) 
Education -0.57 (0.73) -0.66 (0.85)  
Income 3.47 (1.10) 2.72 (1.47)+  
Union Membership -0.41 (0.38) -1.18 (0.55)  
Marital Status -0.11 (0.42) -0.42 (0.58)  
Age 0.30 (0.11) 0.27 (0.15)+  
South 0.71 (0.42)+ 0.27 (0.60)  
Need for Closure  -2.35 (1.50)  
SDO  -4.76 (2.26)  
Racial Resentment  0.97 (1.24)  
Constant -3.67 (0.96) -2.63 (1.39)+ -2.97 (1.26) 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.29 0.17 
 173 125 59 
 
Table A7b: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Non-Whites) 
 CCES YouGov Students 
Authoritarianism 0.70 (0.91) 2.36 (1.30)+ 6.03 (1.90) 
PID Strength 2.70 (1.16) -0.44 (1.32) 2.10 (1.85) 
Ideology 0.56 (1.42) 2.90 (2.40) -5.26 (3.14)+ 
Church Attendance 0.92 (0.96) 0.13 (1.27) 2.02 (2.54) 
Gender -0.69 (0.67) -2.04 (1.10)+ 0.28(1.09) 
Education -0.03 (1.22) 3.10 (1.65)+  
Income 3.21 (2.33) -3.01 (1.88)  
Union Membership -0.18 (0.66) -0.51 (0.88)  
Marital Status -1.10 (0.92) 2.14 (0.98)  
Age 0.07 (0.17) -0.12 (0.29)  
South 0.10 (0.64) 0.93 (0.96)  
Need for Closure  6.95 (3.12)  
SDO  0.46 (2.54)  
Racial Resentment  3.53 (1.90)+  
Constant -2.50 (1.68) -5.47 (2.42) -5.02 (3.02)+ 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.39 0.39 
 87 70 42 
 
Figure A5: Logistic Regression Results Among Republicans Voting for Cruz over Trump 
 
Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 
YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, 
except for age, which is measured in decades. Sample is restricted to Republican identifiers who voted for 
either Trump or Cruz in the 2016 Republican primary. 
Table A8: Logistic Regression Results Among Republicans Voting for Cruz over Trump 
 CCES YouGov Students 
Authoritarianism -0.63 (0.91) -1.18 (0.78) 1.34 (0.93) 
PID Strength 0.06 (0.62) 0.26 (0.56) -1.35 (1.23) 
Ideology 3.98 (1.09) 4.46 (1.37) -0.07 (2.03) 
Church Attendance 0.65 (0.65) 0.79 (0.77) 1.23 (1.08) 
Gender 0.15 (0.49) -1.00 (0.48) 0.36 (0.57) 
Race 0.80 (0.69) 0.05 (0.67) -1.05 (1.11) 
Education 1.92 (0.95) -1.08 (1.06) - 
Income -0.92 (1.23) 1.40 (1.43) - 
Union Membership 0.81 (0.52) 0.03 (0.52) - 
Marital Status 0.24 (0.59) 0.14 (0.55) - 
Age -0.11 (0.15) -0.14 (0.16) - 
South 0.03 (0.44) 0.35 (0.51) - 
Need for Closure - 0.48 (1.18) - 
SDO - 0.60 (1.41) - 
Racial Resentment - -1.05 (1.26) - 
Constant -5.45 (1.65) -2.88 (1.95) -0.09 (1.99) 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.07 
N 145 119 76 
Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Trump and 
1 indicates voting for Cruz, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 
YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, 
except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at p< 0.05. Sample is 
restricted to Republican identifiers who voted for either Trump or Cruz in the 2016 Republican primary. 
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